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CHINA’S WAPI POLICY: SECURITY MEASURE 
OR TRADE PROTECTIONISM?  
ZIA K. CROMER1  
ABSTRACT 
In December of 2003, the Chinese government announced 
that all WLAN equipment sold in China must conform to a 
propriety standard called WAPI, rather than the internationally 
accepted Wi-Fi standard. Moreover, for foreign firms to gain 
access to WAPI technology, they would need to partner with one 
of two-dozen Chinese firms designated by the Chinese 
government. The policy ostensibly grew out of security concerns 
regarding Wi-Fi, although it is unclear whether WAPI is more 
secure. Beijing has now indefinitely postponed the 
implementation of this policy, but WAPI is still relevant. This 
iBrief argues that WAPI is illustrative of many Chinese technical 
barriers to trade in the high-tech sector, and evaluates this 
policy’s consistency with China’s WTO obligations. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Those with an interest in international trade have long wistfully 
thought of China as the last frontier. “For 700 years, ever since outsiders 
first started writing about the place, the western world has believed that 
there are untold riches to be garnered in China.”2 Once China joined the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2001,3 investors and exporters 
hoped the heretofore-elusive market of more than a billion potential 
consumers would finally be cracked open.4 
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2 JOE STUDWELL, THE CHINA DREAM ix (Atl. Monthly Press 2002). 
3 China became the 143rd member of the WTO on November 10, 2001. See 
WTO Ministerial Conference Approves China’s Accession, (Dec. 11, 2001) 
(noting that China’s accession “is an historic moment for the WTO, for China 
and for international economic cooperation”), at 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm. 
4 China’s population is 1.3 billion.  CIA World Factbook, China, at 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html#People (last visited 
Feb. 6, 2005). 
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¶2 Since China’s accession to the WTO, U.S. exports to China have 
increased dramatically from less than $15 billion in 2001 to 
approximately $35 billion in 2004, elevating China to the fifth largest 
export market of the U.S.5 However, it is still difficult to penetrate some 
areas of the Chinese market, “particularly where innovation or 
technology play a key role.”6 For example, China’s 17 percent value-
added tax (“VAT”) on semiconductors raised the ire of U.S. industry and 
trade officials because tax rebates were awarded to domestic 
semiconductor producers that allowed these companies to pay no more 
than 6 percent VAT fees.7 Since this practice put the domestic industry at 
a competitive advantage vis-à-vis imports,8 the U.S. requested formal 
consultations with China at the WTO in March, 20049—a precursor to a 
complaint being lodged—but the parties resolved the issue 
diplomatically.10 China’s WAPI policy can be viewed through the same 
lens: another example of Chinese barriers to trade in the high-tech sector.  
WAPI refers to a proprietary standard for wireless technologies, the use 
of which China announced it would require for all wireless products sold 
in China, rather than the widely-used Wi-Fi standard.  This iBrief argues 
that China’s WAPI policy is inconsistent with its WTO obligations. 
I. CHINA’S WAPI POLICY 
¶3 In late 2003, the Chinese government announced that, as of June 
1, 2004, all Wireless Local Area Network (“WLAN”) equipment sold 
within China would have to comply with a new encryption standard: 
Wireless LAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (“WAPI”).11  
                                                 
5 United States Trade Representative, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S 
WTO COMPLIANCE 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/Section_Ind
ex.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 2004 REPORT]. 
6 Id. at 5.   
7 See, e.g., Mike Clendenin, U.S. Readies Complaint to WTO on China Tax, 
ELEC. ENG’G TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, available at 
http://www.eetimes.com/semi/news/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=UDRXG22M
3KJ1EQSNDBGCKHSCJUMEKJVN?articleID=18400554 (last visited Feb. 7, 
2005). 
8 Tim Beyers, America’s Chip Crusade, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Mar. 19, 2004, at 
http://www.fool.com/news/mft/2004/mft04031919.htm (last visited Feb. 7, 
2005). 
9  China – Value-Added Tax on Integrated Circuits, WT/DS309/1, S/L/160, 
Request for Consultation by the United States, (Mar. 23, 2004). 
10 2004 REPORT, supra note 5, at 37. 
11 Sumner Lemon, Controversy Over Chinese WLAN Standard Deepens, IDG 
NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 10, 2003, at 
http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/12/10/HNchinesecontroversy_1.html (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2005).  
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WLAN is a generic term that refers to the linking of computers to 
communicate with each other by using high frequency radio signals that 
transmit and receive data.12 The global WLAN standard developed by the 
independent Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) is 
Wireless Fidelity (“Wi-Fi”), also known as 802.11.13 The China 
Broadband Wireless Internet Protocol Standards (“BWIPS”) group 
developed WAPI to remedy what it perceived as security flaws in the 
encryption ability of Wi-Fi.14  
¶4 Unlike Wi-Fi, the algorithm of which is available through the 
IEEE to anyone for free,15 WAPI is a proprietary standard. Thus, to gain 
access to WAPI, foreign firms must acquire a license through 
negotiations with any one of two dozen Chinese firms designated by the 
Chinese government.16 This feature quickly led to questions regarding 
Chinese sincerity. “‘Whatever national-security argument there may be 
for encryption, the real motivator is to promote the interests of certain 
Chinese companies over other companies,’ said Ann Stevenson-Yang, 
the managing director of the U.S. Information Technology Office in 
Beijing.”17   
¶5 The wireless industry expressed almost immediate concern 
regarding the WAPI policy. For instance, Intel Corp. announced in 
March, 2004 that it would stop shipping Wi-Fi chips to China by May of 
that year because the perceived benefits of accessing the Chinese market 
did not outweigh the company’s concerns about the new policy.18 Even 
companies that decided to comply with WAPI were not without 
trepidation, as the potential remained for Chinese firms to extort 
                                                 
12 See http://www.wordreference.com/definition/local%5Farea%5Fnetwork, see 
also 
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/wireless%5Flocal%5Farea%5Fnetwor
k (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) (definitions of LAN and WLAN). 
13 Lemon, supra note 11. 
14 Patrick Mannion and Mike Clendenin, China Throws Wi-Fi a Curve, ELEC. 
ENG’G TIMES, Dec. 22-29, 2003, at 1, available at 
http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20031222S0004 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005). 
15 IEEE Standards Association, at http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/ (“This 
program grants public access to view and download current individual IEEE 
Local and Metropolitan Area Network standards at no charge”) (last visited Feb. 
7, 2005). 
16 Intel Tells China: No More Chips, INTERNETNEWS.COM, March 11, 2004, at 
http://www.internetnews.com/wireless/article.php/3324601 (last visited Dec. 2, 
2004) [hereinafter No More Chips].  
17 Mannion and Clendenin, supra note 14, at 58. 
18 No More Chips, supra note 16 (stating that other companies, like Broadcom, 
also decided to stop selling in China because of the WAPI policy, despite the 
large market).   
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technology transfers from foreign wireless companies in return for access 
to WAPI. 19 
¶6 There are many potential negative consequences of China’s 
WAPI policy. First, because the industry loses economies of scale 
associated with a single global standard, WAPI might raise costs for all 
wireless chip producers.20 Second, wireless manufacturers are worried 
that the way in which the Chinese government chose to implement the 
WAPI policy—through mandatory licensing from Chinese firms—would 
constitute an anti-competitive practice.21 Because foreign companies 
must negotiate licenses with Chinese firms, who are potential 
competitors, it might be difficult to secure access to the Chinese market.  
Chinese companies could also engage in price gouging by charging high 
prices for the WAPI standard to inhibit foreign firms’ ability to enter the 
Chinese market. Even worse, the Chinese firms might condition access to 
WAPI on foreign firms agreeing to share valuable intellectual property 
with their Chinese counterparts.22 Some industry insiders even predict 
that the WAPI policy would require all manufacture of WAPI-based 
wireless products to move inside China’s borders because WAPI 
technology cannot leave the country.23 
¶7 Responding to industry concerns, the U.S. government stepped 
in, writing a letter to Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan that noted its 
concerns regarding the WAPI policy.24 The U.S. government was 
especially concerned that the licensing feature might require transfer of 
technology from foreign firms to Chinese competitors.25 The U.S. urged 
China to reconsider its WAPI policy, noting that the new rule “would 
                                                 
19 See id. 
20 Lemon, supra note 11 (noting the IEEE’s concerns regarding WAPI’s 
potential to undermine standardization). 
21 China Regulations: A New Flap Over WAPI Standards, EIU VIEWSWIRE, 
Mar. 17, 2004 [hereinafter New Flap Over WAPI]. 
22 Id. 
23 Michael Kanellos, Divide Between U.S. Tech Firms, China—A Great Wall?, 
CNET NEWS.COM, March 19, 2004, at 
http://news.com.com/Divide+between+U.S.+tech+firms%2C+China--
a+great+wall/2100-1006_3-5175837.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (predicting 
that the hours of work to test each wireless product must be done inside China).  
24 See Letter From Bush Administration Officials to Beijing Protesting Wi-Fi 
Encryption Standards, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2004, at 
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_11/b3874018.htm (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2005) (for a reprinting of the letter, signed by U.S. Trade 
Representative Robert Zoellick, Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans, and 
Secretary of State Colin Powell) [hereinafter Bush Administration Letter]. 
25 See id.  
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appear to be inconsistent with China’s WTO commitments.”26 Officials 
from both countries met in April 2004, and China agreed to suspend 
indefinitely implementation of the WAPI policy.27  
II. IS WAPI CONSISTENT WITH CHINA’S WTO OBLIGATIONS? 
¶8 Although it appears that, at least for now, Beijing will not 
enforce a WAPI standard on wireless products sold in China, analyzing 
whether WAPI is consistent with China’s WTO obligations is still 
valuable. First, China might succumb to domestic industry pressure and 
reintroduce the WAPI policy. Second, this analysis will likely have 
bearing on other Chinese high-tech sector policies in the years to come.  
This section will evaluate the WAPI policy in terms of China’s WTO 
obligations, particularly those found in the Agreement on Technical 
Barriers to Trade28 (“TBT”) and the National Treatment requirement 
found in Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(“GATT”).  This section also analyzes whether, in the event of a 
violation, China’s WAPI policy is excused by the general exceptions 
found in GATT Article XX or the security exceptions of Article XXI.  
A. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade precludes 
government actions like China’s WAPI policy. 
¶9 The TBT “establishes rules and procedures regarding the 
development, adoption and application of … standards … to prevent the 
use of technical requirements as unnecessary barriers to trade.”29 One of 
the stated goals of the TBT is harmonization of national regulatory 
frameworks as a means of “improving efficiency of production and 
facilitating the conduct of international trade.”30 While the GATT is best 
described as a system of negative integration, which states what 
countries are not allowed to do, the TBT is closer to positive 
integration—mandating what governments must do. The TBT 
accomplishes this by requiring countries to follow international technical 
                                                 
26 Id.   
27 Mike Clendenin, Beijing Backs Off Proprietary Spec for Wireless LANs, 
ELEC. ENG’G TIMES, Apr, 26, 2004, at 1, available at 
http://www.eet.com/issue/fp/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=TUROV2SMQPRV
KQSNDBCCKHSCJUMEKJVN?articleId=19200140&kc=6256 (last visited 
Feb. 7, 2005). 
28 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL 
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm [hereinafter TBT 
Agreement]. 
29 2004 REPORT, supra note 5, at 40. 
30 TBT Agreement pmbl., para. 3. 
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standards where they exist, and by justifying deviations from those 
standards in certain circumstances.31 Thus, where the TBT applies, it is 
perhaps more restrictive than the GATT. 
¶10 For a measure to fall within the purview of the TBT, it must be a 
“technical regulation.”32 The three criteria of technical regulations were 
set out by the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines:33 
1. The measure “must apply to an identifiable product 
or group of products”; 
2. The measure “must lay down one or more 
characteristics of the product”; and 
3. “[C]ompliance with the product characteristics must 
be mandatory.”34   
¶11 The WAPI policy would thus fall under the TBT. WAPI applies 
to an identifiable group of products (wireless products) and sets out 
characteristics of those products; namely, that they must comply with the 
WAPI proprietary standard. The third criterion of a technical regulation 
is also met: compliance with WAPI is mandatory if companies wish to 
sell inside of China.35 
¶12 Because WAPI does not comply with the requirements of the 
TBT, requiring the standard runs afoul of the TBT.  The TBT 
“recognizes the important role that international standards play in 
promoting harmonization and facilitating trade.”36 To that end, where 
“relevant international standards exist . . . Members shall use them as a 
basis for their technical regulations except when such international 
standards . . . would be ineffective or inappropriate means for the 
fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued.”37 This means that where 
an international standard exists, and that standard would be effective in 
accomplishing a government’s legitimate regulatory objectives, the 
international standard must be used. Because requirements attach where 
an international standard exists, a question arises as to whether Wi-Fi 
falls into that category. 
                                                 
31 Id. at art. 2.4. 
32 GATT Dispute Appellate Body Report on European Communities Trade 
Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 175 (Sept. 26, 2002) 
[hereinafter EC – Sardines]. 
33 Id., para. 176. 
34 Id. 
35 See id.  
36 Id., para. 214. 
37 TBT Agreement art. 2.4. 
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¶13 The TBT defines a standard as a “[d]ocument approved by a 
recognized body, that provides … rules, guidelines or characteristics for 
products or related processes and production methods.”38 The Appellate 
Body in EC – Sardines rejected the EC’s argument that an international 
standard requires consensus.39 Thus, the test for whether a standard exists 
turns on whether a “‘recognized body’ of the international 
standardization community” adopted it, not whether all parties agreed to 
such a standard.40 In the area of wireless technologies, Wi-Fi is an 
international standard. Wi-Fi was “recently elevated to International 
Organization for Standardization status.”41 As the EC – Sardines case 
makes clear, China’s lack of acceptance of Wi-Fi does not change this 
conclusion. Because an international standard exists, China is obligated 
to base its regulations on the standard unless Wi-Fi “would be an 
ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of legitimate 
objectives.”42 
¶14 The professed purpose behind China’s WAPI policy is a concern 
about the security of Wi-Fi.43 To successfully challenge China’s use of 
the WAPI standard, a complainant must show that Wi-Fi is “[]effective 
or []appropriate”44 for addressing those concerns.45 To do so, a 
complainant should highlight that (a) the rest of the world believes Wi-Fi 
to be sufficiently secure, and (b) it is unclear whether WAPI is more 
secure than Wi-Fi. If a complainant can show that Wi-Fi satisfies China’s 
objectives, the very imposition of a WAPI standard would violate Article 
2.4 of the TBT.46 
¶15 Failing to find a violation of Article 2.4 of the TBT, there is a 
supplementary ground on which to challenge the Chinese WAPI policy. 
The TBT imposes an additional obligation on Members to ensure that 
“technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to fulfill a legitimate objective.”47  There is perhaps an independent claim 
to make that the manner in which China chose to implement its WAPI 
                                                 
38 Id. at Annex 1, Terms and Their Definitions for the Purpose of this 
Agreement, para. 2. 
39 EC – Sardines, supra note 32, at para. 218.  See id., para. 222 (“consensus is 
not required for standards adopted by the international standardizing 
community”). 
40 Id., para. 227. 
41 See id. 
42 See TBT Agreement art. 2.4. 
43 Mannion and Clendenin, supra note 14, at 58. 
44 See TBT Agreement art. 2.4. 
45 See EC – Sardines, supra note 32, at para. 275 (“it is for . . . the complaining 
Member . . . to bear the burden of proving its claim”).  
46 See TBT Agreement art. 2.4. 
47 Id. at art. 2.4. 
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policy, requiring foreign manufacturers to negotiate licenses with a 
limited number of Chinese firms, is more trade-restrictive than necessary 
to accomplish its information security objective. For instance, the 
government itself could have granted licenses on a non-discriminatory 
basis to any company that wished to manufacture wireless equipment for 
the Chinese market. Thus, even if the Chinese government is warranted 
in mandating WAPI, the licensing requirements might nonetheless 
violate Beijing’s obligations under the TBT. 
B. China’s WAPI policy could also be challenged successfully 
under GATT’s National Treatment obligation. 
¶16 In addition to the TBT, China’s WAPI policy possibly runs afoul 
of the National Treatment obligation found in GATT Article III:448 
because WAPI treats domestic wireless manufacturers differently from 
foreign companies. GATT Article III:4 requires that the products made 
by foreign companies “be accorded treatment no less favorable than that 
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, 
regulations and requirements . . . .”49 A complainant who brings such a 
challenge must show:  
1. That the domestic and foreign products in question 
are “like products”;  
2.  That the measure “affects” the product’s internal 
sale; and 
3. That the imported product is treated “less favorably” 
than the like domestic product.50
¶17 Four criteria are used to determine if products are “like”: 
physical properties of the product, end-uses in a given market, consumer 
perceptions, and tariff classification.51 If products are “like,” the measure 
affects the sale, and imported products are treated less favorably than 
domestic products, a National Treatment violation exists. 
¶18 Here, the WAPI policy arguably violates China’s National 
Treatment obligations by giving domestic wireless manufacturers an 
advantage vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. First, Wi-Fi products are 
                                                 
48 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter 
“GATT”], art. III:4 (1994). 
49 Id. 
50 GATT Dispute Appellate Body Report on Korea Measures Affecting Imports 
of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, para. 
133 (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – Beef]. 
51 GATT Dispute Appellate Body Report on European Communities Measures 
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 
85 (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC – Asbestos]. 
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like WAPI products.  Their physical characteristics are similar, they have 
common end-uses, and consumers almost certainly perceive the two 
standards as comparable.52 Second, the WAPI policy obviously affects 
the sale of Wi-Fi within China: it precludes it.  This, in turn, meets the 
third requirement for a National Treatment violation by creating less 
favorable treatment for foreign Wi-Fi products.53 Therefore, it is 
plausible that China’s implementation of WAPI violates its National 
Treatment obligation.54 
¶19 China might argue that even if a National Treatment violation 
has occurred, it is excused by the Article XX General Exceptions, or the 
Article XXI Security Exceptions. Article XX allows countries to violate 
their WTO commitments in limited circumstances, such as when the 
measure is “necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations 
which are not inconsistent” with GATT.55  The regulating country must 
still show that the measure is not applied in a discriminatory fashion.56 
GATT also contains a circumscribed exception for national security, 
which states that, “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to 
require any contracting party to furnish any information . . . it considers 
contrary to its essential security interests.”57 
¶20 Here, however, the WAPI policy is not excused by the General 
Exceptions found in Article XX. Even if requiring WAPI and banning 
Wi-Fi secures compliance with the Chinese information-security 
objectives, Beijing would fail the “necessary” prong of the analysis.58 
The Chinese government could not show that the WAPI policy is 
necessary to accomplish that objective. When determining if a measure is 
necessary, the WTO evaluates the importance of the interest at stake, 
how well the challenged measure contributes to the ends pursued, and 
what effect the measure has on trade.59 Also pertinent is whether there 
                                                 
52 See EC – Asbestos, supra note 51, para. 101.  
53 See Korea – Beef, supra note 50, para. 133. 
54 An additional argument could be made that even if Wi-Fi is not like WAPI, 
foreign WAPI products are disadvantaged, as compared to domestic products, 
because foreign companies are required to negotiate licenses for the WAPI 
standard while the Chinese government gives domestic firms access to WAPI. In 
the extreme, a foreign firm might be excluded from China altogether if no firm 
with access to WAPI is willing to grant a license. See GATT art. III:4. In fact, 
one might expect the difficulty in obtaining a license to correlate with a firm’s 
prior competitiveness within China. More competitive firms would have greater 
difficulty securing WAPI technology from competitors. 
55 Id. at art. XX:(d). 
56 Id. at art. XX (known as the “chapeau”).  
57 Id. at art. XXI:(a). 
58 See id. at art. XX:(d). 
59 Korea – Beef, supra note 50, para. 166. 
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exists an alternative that is consistent with GATT obligations.60 In 
addition, the measure must not be applied in an arbitrary or 
discriminatory manner. 
¶21 Because WAPI probably does not satisfy the rigorous 
requirements of the exceptions to the GATT, any violations to the TBT 
or GATT Article III:3 would most likely not be excused. For example, 
protecting information security is an important government interest; 
however, it is unclear if WAPI is more secure than the default standard, 
Wi-Fi. What is clear is that the WAPI measure would disrupt trade in 
wireless products, at least until foreign manufacturers could negotiate 
licenses to comply with WAPI. Also damaging to China’s case is their 
unilateral action61 in the face of international pressure to work with the 
IEEE to improve Wi-Fi security.62 It is likely that these factors combined 
would prevent China from successfully defending its WAPI policy using 
the exceptions found in Article XX. 
¶22 Even if China could convince the WTO that WAPI is necessary 
to protect one of the enumerated governmental objectives, the policy 
would probably still fail, as it is applied in a discriminatory manner.63 
Only domestic companies are freely given the WAPI standard, whereas 
foreign firms must negotiate to gain access to it.64 This characteristic of 
the WAPI policy is at the heart of what National Treatment proscribes, 
and the exceptions do not excuse such discrimination. 
¶23 Perhaps the security exceptions found in Article XXI could 
excuse China’s potential violations from the WAPI policy. There is no 
case law interpreting the circumstances under which the security 
exceptions may be applied.65 National security is an elastic concept that 
                                                 
60 Id. 
61 That the United States unilaterally imposed a standard, rather than negotiated 
with its trading partners to find an acceptable solution to the problem of sea 
turtle conservation was significant to finding a WTO violation in the Shrimp 
Turtle case.  See GATT Dispute Panel Report On U.S. Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 166 (May. 15, 
1998).  
62 See Mannion and Clendenin, supra note 14, at 58 (calling out to China to 
“‘come and help us [the 802.11 working group] enhance it’”). 
63 See id. at art. XX (requiring that such measures undertaken for legitimate 
purposes “not [be] applied in a manner which would constitute a means of 
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”). 
64 No More Chips, supra note 16.  
65 However, the United States threatened to invoke Article XXI over trade 
restrictions it imposed on Cuba (the parties eventually settled).  See generally 
August Reinish, Widening the US Embargo Against Cuba Extraterritorially, 5 
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changes over time, especially in light of the recent growth in global 
terrorism. Information security takes on a renewed significance under 
these circumstances. Perhaps China, arguing that it can be the sole judge 
of what measures are necessary to protect Chinese national security, 
would prevail in a challenge to the WAPI measures.66 Yet, too expansive 
a reading of the national security exceptions might facilitate cheating by 
Members, undermining the obligations imposed by the WTO system. 
III. PLACING WAPI IN CONTEXT: OTHER CHINESE POLICIES IN THE 
HIGH-TECH SECTOR 
¶24 When thinking about how to categorize China’s WAPI policy, 
whether as a legitimate response to security concerns or a veiled attempt 
at protecting domestic industry, one should place this individual policy 
within a broader context. WAPI is only one of many examples of 
Chinese protectionism in its high-tech sector.67  
¶25 As previously discussed, China’s discriminatory VAT policy in 
the semiconductor industry could have been the template followed for 
the WAPI policy. In both instances, facially neutral measures were used 
to further the underlying industrial policy of promoting domestic 
industry at the expense of foreign counterparts. In addition, both policies 
were withdrawn only after increased U.S. pressure that included threats 
of recourse to the WTO. 
¶26 A recurring theme in Chinese industrial policy is the push to 
develop new standards and parallel technologies. For instance, the 
Chinese government, tired of paying large royalties to the DVD 
consortium, partially funded the development of the Enhanced Versatile 
Disk (“EVD”) to compete with the international standard.68 China also 
launched a homegrown standard for 3G cellular phones, TD-SCDMA.69 
                                                                                                             
EUR. J. INT’L L. 545 (1994), available at 
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol7/No4/art6-07.html.  
66 See id. at 545 (laying out the argument that national security is “auto-
determined”). 
67 See New Flap Over WAPI, supra note 21 (noting that “this is not an isolated 
event. . . . China has adopted a number of policies aimed at boosting home-
grown technologies at the expense of those offered by foreign companies”). 
68 Larry Magid, Chinese Government to Develop Alternative to DVD – EVD, PC 
ANSWER.COM, Nov. 27, 2003, at 
http://www.pcanswer.com/articles/synd_china.htm (last visited May 31, 2005).  
69 See Andrew Orlowski, Trade Wars II: China Shuns Qualcom—No CDMA 
Tax!, THE REGISTER, Nov. 23, 2002, available at    
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/11/23/trade_wars_ii_china_shuns/print.html 
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005). 
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¶27 Promoting the development of new standards is not problematic 
per se; the competition among standards is at the core of technological 
progress and innovation. However, China’s decision to unilaterally 
mandate which standard must be used within its borders slips into trade 
obstruction.70 In addition, China hopes to parlay success on the domestic 
front to influence which standards are adopted on a global scale.71 Hence, 
“China is trying to use the size of its market and a proprietary standard to 
leverage control of the wireless sector.”72 This is of particular concern if, 
due to the underlying cost structure of the market, there is only room for 
one global standard. An aggressive industrial policy might crowd-out 
other standards, despite the relative advantages of each contender. China 
has thus shown itself to be active in molding industrial policy in its high-
tech sector in non-neutral ways.   
CONCLUSION 
¶28 Although each of China’s policies in the high-tech sector may be 
individually be excused, China’s WAPI policy seems to be a clear case 
of excessive protectionism. China’s stance on WAPI furthers its national 
policy of promoting the interests of domestic manufacturers at the 
expense of their foreign competitors. Now that China has become a 
member of the WTO, its international treaty obligations, such as those 
provided by GATT and TBT, might preclude such industrial policies. 
Although WAPI has now faded from international attention after last 
year’s diplomatic settlement, this author would wager that the future will 
bring further attempts by Beijing to unilaterally impose protectionist 
policies on others in the high tech sector.  
                                                 
70 See supra, § II. 
71 Bradford Brown, Joining WTO Means Playing By Global Rules, 
INFORMATIONWEEK, April 5, 2004, at 70, available at 
http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=18700337 (last 
visited May 31, 2005). 
72 Id. 
